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The scope of this topic is broad enough to be beyond prediction
and almost beyond  imagination.  It is  also questionable  whether  one
close to the topic can comment with dispassion and see the forest for
the trees.  I remember  Jim  Watson's  criticism  of the narrowness  of
British biologists  in the  1950s,  especially their non-interest  in bio-
chemistry  and their tendency to "waste  their efforts  on useless  pol-
emics about the  origin of life or how we know that a scientific  fact is
really correct"  (Watson, p. 46).  I will try to be different.
I  am  going to  start from the  widely  held view that there is  some-
thing wrong  with public  policy today.  I  will contrast  some  different
views  about what  is wrong  with public  policy (and its  formation),
identify  some  major common touchstones  of these, look  at some his-
torical experience,  and then venture a few of my own opinions.
Many believe that citizen democracy is not functioning, represent-
ative government has failed,  and the primary role  of public policy
leaders is to reconnect citizens to their political world. But, in assess-
ing any problem,  we need to start by asking why we  are where  we
are today-because  people are  not generally  stupid,  and there  are
good reasons why they are doing what they are doing.
Daniel Yankelovich,  in  his book  Coming to Public Judgment,
assesses the problem as follows:  Americans are not worried about
their political freedom and their political liberty  is not endangered-
they take it for granted,  and among other things this allows them to
focus on their material well-being.  What  is dangerous  is the  erosion
of participation  (p.  1).  Implicitly he  is also talking about the  erosion
of the  effectiveness  of participation.  Contrast this  with the  total-
itarianism  of both the  right and  the left  which spurred participation
to  extremes  as part of the mechanism  of social control.  We  saw this
in Nazi Germany  and in 100  percent voter turnouts in Communist
countries,  but this is  not the sort of participation Yankelovich  is talk-
ing about.
Several  factors have led to this erosion  of participation (which co-
incidentally  erodes the impact of participation and may lead to a de-
cline  in the freedom  to participate).  His  assessment  is that "few  in-
stitutions  are devoted  to helping the  public  form  considered
judgments"  (Yankelovich,  p.  4).  Yankelovich,  the  quintessential
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believes opinions  expressed  at the moment are not the judgments
people would  actually  make.  "The  quality  of public  opinion  is  good
when the  public accepts responsibility  for the consequences of its
views and poor when the public, for whatever reason,  is unprepared
to do so" (Yankelovich,  p. 24,  italics Doering's).
What is important  to Yankelovich  is  a process that gets people  to
public judgment.  This process  includes three phases:  consciousness
raising, working through  and resolution.  This is none other than our
basic  public  policy  education  model  of problem identification,  eval-
uation  (assessing alternatives  and their consequences)  and choosing
a solution (based on facts and values).
One  reason  such  public judgment  is  short circuited  is  that the
media  is not doing its job.  He points out that the  media does  lots of
consciousness  raising with little attention to alternative  solutions and
their  consequences  (the  working-through  process).  The  media  also
falls  down  in agenda  setting-not  correctly  identifying the  problem,
i.e.,  symptoms  rather than the problems  themselves  become the
focus.  Both of these limit the process of coming to public judgment.
Yankelovich  also  believes there  is a problem with the  "Expert-
Public"  gap. This is especially important during the working through
stage.  What is the public to think when the experts disagree?  Part of
this difficulty arises from major differences between  expert and pub-
lic opinion  (even when the experts agree!).  He summarizes  these dif-
ferences as follows:
Expert Opinion  Public Opinion
An empirical proposition.  A value judgment.
Can be validated.  Cannot be validated.
Personal preferences  Personal preferences.
are set aside.  are major focus.
Criteria of quality  Criteria of quality
is validity.  is acceptance  of
responsibility for
one's views.
Many misunderstandings  between  experts  and the public  origi-
nate in "the  differing  points of departure each  side takes to  various
issues"  (Yankelovich,  p. 92).  The technocratic view of the world  and
the  difficulties  in communication  between  experts  or  elites and  the
public  are a major theme  for Yankelovich.  They  figure prominently
in the  inferred causes of the problem he identifies as  "sources of re-
sistance"  (Yankelovich,  pp. 181-189).  These are:
1. A self-centered view of the world.
2.  Threats  to the status of experts.
783.  Modernism as an ingrained philosophy of learning behavior (in-
strumental rationality and the culture of technical control).
4.  The worship of Science.
His view is similar to the kind of skepticism exhibited in the late
1800s  by Mark Twain (read Connecticut Yankee  . . . ) and others to-
ward the dominance of technology  and the technical elite.  There are
some  interesting messages  here for those  who  consider themselves
technical specialists who know what ought to be done.
In summary:  the message  from Yankelovich  is that public  opinion
on  which  policy  is  based  today  is  ill-formed  and  incompletely
formed. What is needed for good public policy  is what he calls public
judgment.  Some of us would see public judgment as the product of a
traditional  public  policy education  experience  that  integrates  effec-
tive  problem identification,  consideration  of a  range  of alternatives
and their  consequences,  and the  final decision  which  includes
values,  facts and  an acceptance  of the consequences  in making the
final individual judgment.
Frances Lappe has another view (and describes another part of
the  public  policy  elephant)  in  her book  Rediscovering America's
Values. She believes we should use our values as guides for the way
we decide and conduct  policy.  My immediate response to that state-
ment is to reflect upon the difficulties Woodrow Wilson brought upon
us when he began doing this in the conduct of foreign policy.  This
leaves me  with some disquiet,  and a feeling that this may work
sometimes, rather than with a ringing endorsement of this approach.
Lappe  continues:  "We  have  institutionalized  our  values,  these
very institutions  are now  in trouble,  and  we have thus lost the
strength  and freshness  of the application  of our values  (through in-
stitutions)  to considering  appropriate  policy."  As we  read further,  it
becomes clear Lappe is concerned about some very specific values.
Lappe focuses  on the Liberal belief of self-centeredness-the
Hobbes and Bentham idea of the basic competitive nature  of man
which  causes  real problems  when  debating  or  deciding  public
issues.  In the past,  this  competitive  individualism  was mitigated  by
Western religion  even though Liberal thought sanctified  institutions
like private property and the market in a way that further  mitigated
against useful and productive  common  decision making.  In the  Lib-
eral tradition, private  property's role was to provide "a source of in-
dependence  against state power and other individuals."  Also,  the
market did  not require  any  "consensus  about community  needs
while directly expressing individual desires" (Lappe, p.  10).
Lappe not only defines the Liberal (with a capital "L") tradition
correctly,  but also effectively uses Adam Smith as a counter  argu-
ment-something  to make  conservative  economists  gnash their
teeth.  She says Smith thought the individual's  sense of self worth
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rules above  individual human  accountability.  There  is something  of
a chicken-and-egg  difficulty  here about priorities  and precedence-
the individual  or the common  good.
Lappe wants  society to have a sociologist's  or cultural  anthropolo-
gist's view  of the world (not realizing  that the old  cultural anthropol-
ogy tradition  has been ridden  out  of that  profession).  A  democratic
government  is not to be just a means to an  end, but prized through
certain community  values in its own right.  (What we see here  is a
"Mr.  Smith  Goes  to Washington"  view of democracy).  Lappe  holds
that today, private property  and the market should  not be institu-
tions just  for protecting  or enhancing  the individual  but should  be-
come  mere "devices  subordinated  to  our socially  defined needs"
(Lappe, p.  13).  Property rights become rights of membership.  Adam
Smith's broader concept of social justice plays in here as well.  What
Lappe  calls for is  a change in the dominant set of traditional Liberal
values as a solution for inappropriate  policy that is based upon an in-
appropriate  view of the world and an individual's  place in it.
Lappe  is  advocating  changing  society  (societal  values)  to  change
policy while Yankelovich is advocating changing the process through
which the public expresses its wishes about policy decisions. Is soci-
ety misinforming policymakers  so we have to change the process,  or
is the nature  of today's  society such that we have to change it  (its
values)  to  get "good"  policy?  Alternatively,  are institutions  at fault?
I, for one,  am certainly not going to answer this question for you!
Typifying the institutional approach,  Harry Boyte comments  that,
"Institutional  politics  is the practice  in  most large organizations  and
in government,  it involves  a strongly hierarchical structure,  a lan-
guage  of rational  calculation  of individual  costs  and benefits,  and a
largely  one-way  information  flow.  This  is what has  left most people
in the roles of spectator and political consumer  today. It's what peo-
ple love to hate" (Boyte, p.  5,  italics Doering's).
Benjamin Barber refines  this distinction  claiming,  "It  is almost  as
if there are two democracies  in America:  the one defined by national
parties  and presidential  politics  and bureaucratic  policies,  a remote
world  circumscribed  by Washington's  beltway,  walling  in the  politi-
cians even  as it walls  out the citizens;  and the other  defined by
neighborhood  and  block  associations,  PTAs  and  community  action
groups,  an intimate  domain no larger than a town or rural county
where  women  and  men gather  in  small groups  to adjudicate  differ-
ences  or plan common tasks.  With  something  of a pejorative  sneer,
we call the first "politics,"  cynical about the corruption of politicians,
skeptical  about the competence  of voters or about the possibilities  of
participation in affairs so complex and institutions so bureaucratized.
But about  the second  we  wax exuberant,  celebrating  its spirited
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ate it with politics or democracy  at all"  (Barber, p. xi.).
Clearly there are very different views about what these people see
as the basic  problem of public  policy today.  It is fair to ask  at this
point whether  these commentators  are addressing  symptoms rather
than causes.  None of them explicitly deal with:
1.  The tremendous  economic  changes  since  the  Second  World
War,  wherein  our nation started as the dominant economy  in
the post war period  and is now being  forced to accept  a lesser
status.
2.  The  great changes in demographics  over  the last generation
that include  changes in density,  age distribution,  ethnic com-
position,  and comparative  well-being.
3.  The demise of the American melting-pot ideal.
4.  The critical  role of elites  in changing or setting societal  values.
(One would certainly have expected Lappe to focus on this).
5.  The rapidly changing view of what is "correct"  politically.
There  have  been  a number  of extremely important  historical
changes.  Among them  are the changes  in the nation's economy  and
shifts  in regional  power as well as the changing power shifts related
to demographics.  Our notion of what is "progressive"  has changed-
it is no longer equated with the populist views of the late  nineteenth
and early twentieth century.
We  have seen the demise of the Victorian-based  reforms that
shaped what good and appropriate  societal activities were for sever-
al past generations.  These include  a  further change  in the role and
place of women today-a further evolution  from the Victorian ac-
complishment  of placing  women  and children  in  a  protected  status
less subject to physical abuse.  We have seen great changes in the ex-
pectations for, content of, and quality of education.  We have seen
changes in the definition  of public and private  ethics away  from the
puritanical  Victorianism, some of which may have been hypocritical,
but  some  of which  fostered accepted  behavior,  trust and  shared
ideals  between individuals.  (This change made the  savings and loan
scandals  possible-and  the  public does  not seem  to care that much
about it,  as long as the costs are paid later!).  Finally,  we  have seen
the demise of the folklore of personal  honesty, thrift and hard  work
which served as an important stimulus to productivity and a sense of
community  responsibility-something  Lappe  does  not take  into  ac-
count when talking almost  exclusively about the competitive  Liberal
tradition.  All of these  are major factors if we are to try to explain
why we are where we are today.
Coupled with this has been a critical change  in the basic content of
our  national policy  in America.  In the past our national  agenda  in-
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the settling of the  land; and the populist social reform  goals to make
society  better-educating,  protecting  and  giving  opportunity  to  the
young and the  less fortunate  on the  one hand and,  on the other, at-
tempting to  limit  the  scope  of the  powerful  and  wealthy to prevent
their taking advantage  of their position.  All  of this took place during
a period  of growing  national wealth  and prominence  based upon  a
superb natural resource  endowment  easily capable  of supporting
our growing population.
Today,  there  is  no overriding  national agenda-little  sense  of na-
tion building or of building  a national  culture.  There  are fewer
shared ideals,  where previously  many opinion setters shared a com-
mon agenda  including some  degree  of social responsibility.  We  face
a declining  resource  base  for essential  production  inputs  and  pres-
sure on basic life resources  like air and water.  Most importantly,  the
critical economic  questions being  faced today  are  divisive ones over
power,  wealth  and income distribution.  People  scramble to get  a
larger share  for themselves  with less focus on  economic  growth  for
everyone.  The  compensation  for Fortune  500  CEOs has  gone  from
thirty-five  times  their workers'  average  pay in the  mid-1970s  to  143
times in 1992  (Wall Street Journal, p.  1).  We see fights over  major
economic  stakes in the debate on national health care.  Some worry
about the distribution of resources  going increasingly toward the old
rather than the young-others are concerned about the declining at-
tention given to investment  in the future which is being sacrificed for
current consumption.
All  of these  are major factors  if we are to try to explain why we
are where we are today,  and many  of the commentators  on our na-
tional dilemma  focus instead on merely jiggering the present system
to  get us somewhere  else.  Jiggering  the system  will  not have  suffi-
cient impact to alter the paths of so many loaded trains that have al-
ready gathered speed in other directions.
There have been many  basic changes in our society,  its make-up,
its values, and in the resources available  to support it. This will have
to lead  to changes  in the way society  decides issues under almost
any view of where our society should be going.
The nature  and content of current and future  public policy  is just
very  different from what it was in the past and will evolve into some-
thing  different  in the  future.  These  new  issues  are stressful  on the
decision process  in different  ways-all of which will require that de-
cisions be made differently from the way they were in the past.
Given this change  in society  and in the  basic nature of the  critical
public  policy issues for society,  I would not expect just a process  re-
form such as Yankelovich suggests to meet our public policy decision
making needs.  I would not expect a sudden shift to Lappe's more so-
cially-based set  of values  to do the job either.  In fact,  we already
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occur  as  a matter  of course  in open  societies.  For example,  an
important redefinition  of property rights has already taken place.  In
the dispute over the preservation  of wetlands,  those  who  own wet-
lands  have lost some  of the discretionary  rights over  their property
to the general public that prefers to preserve this resource.
My  own bias leads me to believe there may be real value  in trying
to  modify  decision-making  institutions  so  national  decisions  receive
more  of the attention and participation  of the individual as Boyte
and Barber suggest. But progress here is not made in a vacuum.  We
will have to do a better job identifying the changes  in society and
public policymaking  that have  already taken place  and try to better
gauge their impact upon current and future policymaking.  This must
be part  of the  definition  process  of the causes  of our current  dilem-
mas-the "why  we are where we  are today"  that should have a log-
ical explanation.  If we cannot make this identification,  we may be
chasing  symptoms.  If we cannot  speak with some  accuracy  and  au-
thority about why we happen to be investing  less today in our youth
and more in our  elderly we  are unlikely  to provide a good basis  for
the public to ask  if they want to continue in this direction  or change
to another path.
Tim Wallace pointed out  in our discussion  that change  is  made at
the periphery  (the  local level,  the more modest  decision),  and  that
we do accomplish a great deal by aiding this process.  I agree  with
this, but believe we need to try to keep a broader focus  to ensure
that we  deal  with core societal  issues  and also with  the question  of
more effective consideration  of public policy issues determined  at
the center of government.
Jerry Howe raised the critical question of institutional change-
not only for decision  making but also for implementing new policies.
If our changing society  makes  a new policy  shouldn't we  pay atten-
tion that  institutions  also  change  to make  that  new  policy happen?
The answer is certainly yes.
Both of these are important considerations.  I would add that I  am
not sure exactly what direction the public policy process or public
policy education should move  in, but we should  be moving some-
where different from where we are today. My view is that where we
are today still reflects  a  past that is no  longer with us in. terms of
issues,  values, priorities and the decision making process itself.
We must  do  a better job identifying  the major drivers  of policy
change that operate today and tomorrow, and as part of this process
do a better job identifying those issues that are (and will be) relevant
to society.  This is all the more difficult because we  do not have an
identified and commonly shared national agenda.  We are dealing in-
stead with narrower issues and concerns over which there is not uni-
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dealt with.
I  am convinced  the success  of Perot  in  gaining  as large  a vote  as
he did in the 1992  presidential election stems from his focus on issues
of concern to the public that were being ignored or not dealt  with by
the two major parties.  Given the megalithic structure  of our two na-
tional political parties today,  they are  increasingly  less flexible  in
shedding old  concerns  and taking  on new  ones.  This inflexibility  is
part of what  Boyte and  Barber are talking about.  The  cost and
media structure of the political process we have today give  even less
opportunity  for ventures  like  Teddy  Roosevelt's  Bull Moose  party.
However,  it  is increased  flexibility to take  on new public issues  and
deal with them effectively that  will,  in  my view,  be the critical  hall-
mark of how effectively we, as a nation,  cope with the future.
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